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TINA for Putin – Or is there an alternative?  
Marc Franco 
EU Relations with Russia hit the news 
headlines this week. The visit of EU High 
Representative Josep Borrell, launched in a 
constructive spirit, ended up in a diplomatic 
catastrophe. The Navalny saga and the recent 
weekly demonstrations all over Russia have 
been commented on at length in the Western 
press. What is going on in Russia? How to 
interpret the recent surge of aggressiveness of 
the Russian authorities?  Are the protests just a 
small hiccup in a stable Putin regime, or is 
something more going on? To be clear, this is 
neither the end nor, probably, the beginning of 
the end of a regime. But the events are far from 
insignificant. In this article I look at the 
ongoing events from three angles: what is the 
Putin regime up to? What is behind the recent 
wave of protests? And what are the 
implications for the EU’s relations with 
Russia? 
 
WHAT IS THE PUTIN REGIME UP TO?   
The last decade, and the last five years in 
particular, witnessed the increasing repression of 
the opposition forces inside Russia, and the 
increasing aggressiveness of Russian foreign 
policy.  
 
Opposition figures have been physically 
eliminated abroad as well as in Russia. The 
freedom of assembly and of expression has been 
gradually restricted. Demonstrations have 
become a dangerous activity. Organisers and 
participants are arrested and face fines and stiff 
prison sentences. Indiscriminate arrests are in the 
same category as in Belarus (although the 
treatment of arrested persons is admittedly not as 
brutal). The aim is clearly to frighten people off 
the streets. Although the written press stays 
relatively free, television and radio (with some 
notable exceptions: Doshd Channel, Ekho 
Moskvi) serve as the conduit for government 
propaganda.  A strong counter current against the 
mainstreaming and brainwashing of public 
opinion exists in the still free social media, 
although the government has given itself the legal 
means for suspending sites if judged necessary.  
 
At the same time, Russia’s assertiveness, if not 
aggressiveness, in its external relations is 
illustrated by its invasion of Ukraine and its 
ruthless interventions in Syria, as well as less 
visible examples of activism in North Africa 
(Libya) and Africa South of the Sahara (the 
 
 





Central African Republic). This show of foreign 
policy activism is important also to Russian 
public opinion. Not only to the political elite, but 
in the eyes of the Russian citizen as well, Russia’s 
regional and global influence is a constituent 
element of Russian national identity: Russia has a 
mission in the world. 
 
Good internal governance and stability, a steady 
increase of national welfare (rising standards of 
living for the average Russian citizen and 
consolidation and growth of business for the 
oligarchs), and a growing role of Russia (as a 
world power on a par with the US) were and 
remain the pillars of the legitimacy of the present 
regime. But as the economy has been stagnating 
for a decade, the dissatisfaction of the middle 
class with the corrupt and clumsy governance of 
the country is mounting – a crisis is developing. 
Russia cannot rely on a totalitarian ideology and 
an almighty party to control this dissatisfaction. 
Political technology – that was the soft approach 
to handling the opposition – no longer does the 
trick. Within the ruling elite, the security forces 
have taken increasingly over from the political 
technologists.  
 
Navalny is no longer a threat to deal with but an 
enemy to destroy as, at this moment, he is the 
person who gives a face to the opposition and is 
able, with his activism against corruption and his 
campaign for “smart voting”, to make 
increasingly serious dents in the credibility of the 
regime.  
 
For Russian public opinion, the increasing 
regional and global role of Russia can to a certain 
extent compensate for shortcomings in other 
policy areas. But this global power position costs 
money. When one knows that “great power” 
Russia has the economic size of the Benelux, one 
might conclude that “imperial overreach”, which 
led to the breakdown of more than one empire in 
history, has become a danger not to be neglected. 
 
To sum up: there are indications of a panic 
reaction in the ruling elite. To beat the opposition 
movement, the regime goes to the limits of what 
an “illiberal democracy” can allow. Massive 
arrests and rumours of intimidation and torture 
of arrested protestors are only a short distance 
away from the dictatorial practices of 
neighbouring Belarus, and evokes memories of 
Soviet practices. 
 
WHAT ABOUT THE RECENT WAVE OF 
PROTESTS IN RUSSIA? 
The protest movements of the last years are not 
a mortal danger to the Putin regime. They are 
nevertheless important as they indicate that 
increasingly large sections of the population do 
not accept the practices of the present ruling 
establishment. 
 
The regime lost the support of part of the 
Moscow and Saint-Petersburg “intelligentsia” 
and, more generally, the middle class in the 
protests of Bolotnya Ploshad in 2011-2012 
against the manipulated election results. A skilful 
political technology approach succeeded in 
avoiding that the protests led to a snowball effect. 
Since then, protests have concentrated on 
specific local issues: the Moscow elections, the 
construction of a cathedral in Ekaterinburg, a 
garbage dump in Arkhangelsk, the imprisonment 
of the Governor in Khabarovsk, etc. The 
exception was the nation-wide protest against the 
pension reform, that required Putin’s 
intervention. These kinds of protest are of course 
banal from a Western point of view, but they are 
relevant in a country that is only just over a 
generation away from a totalitarian regime that 









Like the earlier protest movements, the present 
demonstrations show Russian society is in rapid 
evolution. The present demonstrations are a 
continuation of the earlier protest movements 
but do have some interesting new characteristics. 
 
In the first place, the development of the middle 
class should be mentioned. These people are 
educated, do not tolerate the manipulation of 
elections, and defend their own economic 
interests. They are increasingly assertive, want to 
protect their property against corruption, and to 
safeguard their economic perspectives. These are 
the educated 30-40 years old that were on 
Bolotnaya Ploshad, and that now have been 
joined by new 30-40 years old in the present 
demonstrations. 
 
Secondly, a new group of demonstrators has 
joined the protests: teenagers. They have never 
known, directly or indirectly, the totalitarian 
Soviet regime and the fear of the state authorities. 
They have never been told that “the party is 
always right”, and feel they are entitled to express 
their own opinion. They get their information 
from and are networking through social media. 
Protesting is linked in part to their age, but more 
importantly it reflects the fact that they cannot 
understand why the state denies them the rights 
of citizenship (freedom of expression, of 
assembly, etc.), although they are clearly 
mentioned in the constitution.  
 
A third aspect of the recent protest movement is 
that it is no longer limited to Moscow and Saint-
Petersburg. The demonstrations of the last weeks 
took place in more than 100 cities. The political 
technologists could dismantle the 2011-2012 
protests by condemning them as demonstrations 
of a spoilt Moscow bourgeoisie defending their 
own privileges, isolated from “deep Russia” that 
allegedly appreciated what the regime had 
accomplished and continued to rally around the 
president. The spread of the present protests over 
the whole of Russia kills the “deep Russia” 
argument, and is an indication of a malaise that 
goes further than the two major cities. 
 
Navalny’s campaign for “smart voting” did the 
ruling party some damage during last year’s 
regional election. Navalny skilfully energizes 
these opposition movements by targeting 
corruption by the ruling elite (Medvedev and 
Putin in the first place), and by presenting an 
alternative to the ruling party other than the fake 
opposition parties: the Communists and the 
Liberal (?) Democratic (?) Party. 
 
With the national parliamentary elections 
scheduled for September of this year, the fear 
exists that the position of United Russia could be 
seriously dented. Would that constitute a direct 
danger for the regime? Probably not. But as an 
indication of the erosion of support for the party, 
the government, and the President, it may well 
seriously shake up the balance of power in the 
establishment, and strengthen the hand of more 
moderate, more liberal sections of the 
establishment. This may well be the reason why 
the security forces, as a pre-emptive move, have 
taken over the management of the protests from 
the political technologists. The effective outcome 
may well be the reverse of the intention of the 
security forces: the brutal and indiscriminate 
treatment of Navalny and of the protestors may 
well have the opposite effect.   
 
BORRELL’S VISIT: RIGHT OR WRONG?  
Borrell’s visit was by no means a faux pas. The 
trip to Moscow was a courageous and correct 
decision. It was correct to try to explore what 
common ground could be found to restart a 
relationship that has been deteriorating for a 
decade and was put on ice after the Russian 
intervention in Ukraine. The March 2016 "Five 
Principles" offer a framework suitable for finding 
 
 





a way forward in line with EU’s “principled 
pragmatism”, provided there is goodwill on the 
other side. 
 
A perspective on a way forward could have been 
a good starting point for the planned discussion 
in the Foreign Affairs Council later this month 
and the European Council in March. It could 
have been a possibility to bridge the split between 
the Russia-friendly and the Russia-critical 
member states. Since March 2016, this split has 
condemned the EU to an uncomfortable 
immobilism, reducing political debates on EU-
Russia to recycling, with six months intervals, the 
“Five Principles” and the sanctions.  
 
Borrell’s visit was an opportunity offered to the 
Russian side to break the deadlock. The HR put 
his credibility on the line with some of the 
Member States who never stop criticising (also 
for bad reasons) the Russian side. Foreign 
Minister Lavrov did not seize the opportunity. 
On the contrary, in his inimitable and well-
exercised style he indulged in EU-bashing, and 
replied to every topic that the HR put on the table 
with his routine “what-about-ism”. 
(Un)Diplomatic insults made a constructive 
exchange of views impossible. The obvious aim 
of Russian diplomacy was to put Borrell on the 
wrong foot and exacerbate the split within the 
EU, counting on the “Putin Versteher” among 
the member states to consolidate EU 
immobilism, giving them a free hand to continue 
business as usual in their relations with Russia. 
This time this calculation may be wrong.  
 
The poisoning of Navalny, his arrest and 
imprisonment on the basis of flimsy legal 
arguments, the repression of the widespread 
demonstrations in Russia, the expulsion of three 
EU diplomats on a fake basis (during the visit of 
the HR), may just be pushing Russia’s luck too 
far. Although Germany and France have made 
some positive noises and seem to see no need to 
link the Navalny affair to North Stream II, the 
pressure of public opinion and of other Member 
States may be too strong to pretend there is no 
problem. 
 
By not seizing the opportunity to engage in a 
dialogue and by retreating on an imagined 
Russian moral high ground, the Russian side 
showed disrespect for its interlocutor. This 
attitude constituted a political insult to the EU as 
a whole. 
 
Minister Lavrov is one of the most experienced 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Russian 
diplomatic service is one of the best in the world. 
It is unlikely that they do not realise the damage 
that they were doing to the EU-Russia relations 
now and to its evolution in the near future. This 
show of aggressiveness is not a manifestation of 
strength, but of weakness, of fear, and of the 
incapacity to give up the zero-sum game 
approach to foreign policy. Insecurity makes it 
impossible for the Russian side to make 
concessions that can result in constructive 
compromises. This supports the assumption 
developed in the previous section: there is some 
form of panic in the leading elite in Russia. They 
fear that the basis of the Putin regime is eroding, 
and (even more importantly) that therefore the 
consensual support between the various 
components of the leading elite is in danger. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The present wave of protests is an indication of the 
changes in Russian society. No political technologist, 
however skilled, and no law enforcer, however brutal, 
will easily be able to stop these societal changes. In the 
absence of other political opposition forces, Navalny 
can energize a movement that, not directly but 
through its impact on the balance of power in the 
ruling establishment, may have an impact on domestic 
and foreign policy in Russia. The security forces will 
 
 





try to keep the situation under control and reinforce 
the authoritarian tendencies of the regime. However, 
Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and the 
transformation of an authoritarian into a totalitarian 
regime is improbable. It is by no means certain how 
the situation will evolve in the months to come, but 
things may get worse before they get better. Societal 
evolutions are difficult if not impossible to predict, as 
the fall of Communism and the Arab Spring have 
illustrated. 
 
Amid this uncertainty, it is a major challenge for the 
EU to define and implement adequate policies, 
inspired by EU values and interests, avoiding a further  
deterioration of relations, keeping in mind the great 










EU-Russia relations. Borrell’s mission was a laudable 
attempt to find constructive ways forward, an attempt 
that unfortunately was not met with an adequate 




Marc Franco is a Senior Associate Fellow at the 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations in Brussels. He was Head of the 
European Commission’s Delegation to Russia 





















The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. 
Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to 
interdisciplinary research. 
www.egmontinstitute.be 




for International Relations 
